How the Gaza and Iran wars reshaped the defensive arms market in the region

Arms-deal data for Middle Eastern states between 2020 and 2026 show that the region's arms market no longer moves according to the conventional logic that governed decades of military spending, when fighter jets, tanks and warships were the headline items of any procurement package.

Taken together, the data from the 11 states indicate that as ballistic missiles, drones and long-range attacks have come to dominate modern warfare, purchasing priorities have turned increasingly towards air defence, interception and precision munitions.

The investigation tracked the change in each of the states it monitored, as follows:

Egyptian procurement data for 2020–2026 reveal a gradual shift in spending priorities. Cairo no longer focuses solely on modernising its fighter jets and naval vessels; it has begun giving growing weight to air-defence systems, radars and precision munitions — a clear response to the threats imposed by the region's modern wars.

The data show that the early years of the period saw the completion of conventional force modernisation programmes, through contracts for French Rafale fighters, Italian FREMM frigates and German MEKO A-200 EN vessels, alongside the South Korean K9 Thunder howitzer programme, CH-47F Chinook helicopters and American C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft.

This pattern reflects a clear diversification of arms sources across the United States, Europe and South Korea, with Russia and China conspicuously absent — a trend consistent with data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which points to a decline in Russia's share of the global arms export market in recent years.

More recent contracts, however, reveal a striking change in the nature of the purchases. Egypt has moved to expand its holdings of guided munitions, such as Hellfire AGM-114R missiles and the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), alongside the modernisation of its missile craft with advanced command-and-control systems.

That shift peaked with the deal for the NASAMS air-defence system and AN/TPS-78 early warning radars — two of the largest defence contracts Egypt concluded during the period.

Recent Saudi deals reveal a clear turn in military purchasing, away from conventional combat platforms and precision offensive munitions and towards building defensive layers capable of absorbing attacks by missiles, drones and loitering munitions.

The $9 billion American Patriot missile deal Saudi Arabia signed in 2026 was not merely a replenishment of a missile stockpile. It signalled the move of air and missile defence to the centre of gravity of Saudi military planning — especially after threats from Iran and its allied armed groups became denser, more varied and more costly to intercept.

This post-Gaza and post-Iran shift does not mean Riyadh has abandoned air power or offensive munitions: in February 2026 it concluded deals to support its F-15 fighters, buy AMRAAM missiles and acquire Turkish drones.

Since the Gaza war and the escalation in the Red Sea that followed it, the threat has no longer been confined to conventional battlefields. It now extends to trade routes, energy and supply chains — elements at the heart of Saudi Arabia's economic project and Vision 2030, which aims, as the document states, to turn the kingdom into an industrial power and a global logistics hub.

The escalation with Iran, meanwhile, has redefined the principal danger facing Saudi Arabia. It is not a ground invasion or a broad conventional war, but relatively low-cost long-range attacks — by drones, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles — capable of striking airports, oil facilities, desalination plants and critical infrastructure.

Between 28 February and 21 July 2026, Saudi Arabia recorded at least 944 missiles and drones launched towards its territory: 833 drones, 86 ballistic missiles, nine cruise missiles and 16 of undetermined type, according to figures reported by the Saudi defence ministry and counts compiled by Reuters.

These are confirmed minimum figures: they exclude Houthi attacks for which the authorities did not announce the number of projectiles fired.

Defensive deals — Patriot, Link-16 tactical data-link systems, and sustainment and training programmes — therefore look like part of an attempt to build a defensive architecture that ties early warning to interception and to command and control, rather than relying on a single system or a single supplier.

Emirati procurement reveals a gradual move away from acquiring air-superiority platforms and towards fortifying the country's airspace and critical infrastructure against mounting threats.

In the years preceding the Gaza and Iran wars, attention was focused on strengthening offensive capability: the pursuit of F-35 fighters, a contract for Rafale jets, the acquisition of MQ-9 drones and the expansion of a stockpile of high-precision guided munitions.

The deals struck between 2022 and 2026, however, reveal a clear turn in operational priorities towards building multi-layered air defence.

Contracts in that period included the purchase of the THAAD system for ballistic-missile interception, the M-SAM II system for medium-range air defence, and a long-range discrimination radar to strengthen early warning — alongside the FS-LIDS system for countering small, slow, low-flying drones.

This orientation emerged immediately after the Gaza war, as the UAE found itself facing not merely the prospect of a conventional war between armies, but a mode of warfare built on missiles, drones and the targeting of critical infrastructure and trade routes.

The American war on Iran also pushed Abu Dhabi to reassess the cost of relying on fighter jets alone. Advanced fighters confer considerable deterrent power and long-range strike capability, but they cannot on their own answer attacks that combine ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and low-cost drones.

The American arms package announced for the UAE in 2026 illustrates this, amounting to an attempt to close three main gaps in Emirati defences:

1- Detection, discrimination and early warning, through the purchase of long-range radars integrated with THAAD, and THAAD command, control and communications stations.

2- Drone interception, through the purchase of fixed FS-LIDS counter-drone systems, Coyote Block 2 interceptors, KuMRFS radars, Coyote launchers, electro-optical and thermal cameras, and FAAD C2 command-and-control systems — providing an integrated capability to detect small, slow, low-flying drones.

3- Maintaining air readiness through AMRAAM missiles and F-16 munitions.

These packages reflect a move towards an interconnected air-defence network that combines detection, interception and command and control before threats reach cities and vital facilities.

Qatari procurement data for 2025–2026 reveal a clear shift in spending priorities compared with the period preceding the Gaza and Iran wars: the major contracts concentrated on strengthening air defence, drones and precision munitions rather than expanding purchases of fighter jets, warships or heavy land platforms.

The pattern indicates that Doha now prioritises protecting its airspace and vital installations, in a security environment defined more by the risk of missiles and drones than by conventional confrontation.

The data show that the largest deal of the period was the replenishment of the Patriot stockpile, worth some $4.01 billion — a reflection of the emphasis on sustaining the existing air-defence system and preserving its operational readiness.

At the same time, the deal for eight MQ-9 drones — accompanied by munitions and reconnaissance and precision-strike equipment, approved by the U.S. State Department in March 2025 — showed that Qatar now regards drones not merely as a reconnaissance tool but as part of an integrated system combining intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and precision strike, in line with what the MQ-9 offers.

The data also reveal an almost total dependence on the United States as supplier: every contract recorded involves advanced American systems in air defence, drones and precision munitions.

Kuwaiti procurement likewise reveals a clear shift from conventional combat platforms towards building a multi-layered air and missile defence architecture.

The more recent contracts, concluded after 2023, are aimed less at adding new offensive capability than at protecting airspace, vital installations and military bases against mounting threats.

That shift is visible in contracts signed during the period for the Patriot system for ballistic-missile interception, the NASAMS medium-range air-defence system, and an integrated air-defence command-and-control system tying radars, launchers and command centres into a single network — alongside Anduril systems designed to counter drones through kinetic interception and electronic warfare.

The change came amid a security environment that altered rapidly after the Gaza war, which demonstrated how widely missiles and drones are now used in regional conflicts, and then the American war on Iran, which underlined the value of air-defence systems capable of meeting combined attacks.

The data show that Kuwait now prioritises building an interconnected defensive network combining early warning, interception and command and control — strengthening its ability to protect vital installations and handle modern air threats — over increasing the number of conventional combat platforms.

Bahrain's deals between 2022 and 2025 follow a relatively different path from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait over the same period. The turn towards layered air defence does not appear in the form of Patriot or NASAMS purchases or major counter-drone systems, but rather in the repurposing of conventional weapons to serve deterrence and protection.

After the Gaza war and the widening margin of escalation with Iran, and unlike the larger Gulf states, Bahrain is not buying complete defensive layers so much as reinforcing the tools of resilience and rapid deterrence within a regional environment more exposed to missiles, drones and Iranian pressure.

This shows in the data: the largest deal was a contract for 50 upgraded Abrams tanks worth some $2.2 billion, reflecting continued investment in heavy land power.

Bahrain also strengthened its offensive capability by buying long-range HIMARS launchers and upgrading its M270 launchers to the latest standard, giving its armed forces greater capacity for long-range precision strikes and raising the readiness of its rocket artillery.

In the air domain, procurement concentrated on preserving operational readiness rather than introducing new platforms: it included a programme to support and sustain F-16 fighters, alongside the refurbishment of Super Cobra attack helicopters.

This suggests Bahrain has preferred to extend the service life of its existing air capabilities rather than invest in costly new fleets.

As in Bahrain, Omani procurement between 2020 and 2026 reveals neither a wave of defensive armament nor a clear move towards layered interception systems. It reflects instead the continuation of a limited military approach consistent with Muscat's foreign policy of neutrality and avoiding escalation.

After the Gaza war and the escalation with Iran, Oman appears less inclined than its neighbours to buy major air-defence systems.

According to the accompanying table, Oman's armament doctrine between 2020 and 2026 centred on "sustainable self-reliant defensive security": it preferred to invest in localising maintenance, in space-based reconnaissance and in improving the efficiency of existing assets, rather than joining the regional arms race for the billion-dollar long-range air and missile defence systems that characterised the other Gulf states' deals.

Moroccan procurement data for 2020–2026 reveal a clear shift in spending priorities, with the kingdom investing increasingly in air defence, drones and precision munitions rather than concentrating on conventional military platforms.

The nature of the deals suggests the aim is no longer confined to strengthening offensive capability, but has become the construction of a system capable of countering the missiles, drones and air threats imposed by modern warfare.

The data show that Morocco continued to modernise its armed forces through a range of deals including HIMARS rocket launchers, long-range ATACMS missiles and AH-64E Apache helicopters — but the most significant portion of the contracts went towards establishing a multi-layered air-defence network.

This stands out in the inclusion of Morocco, according to reports, among the states approved to receive American PAC-3 MSE Patriot interceptors, alongside the Israeli Barak MX system — a sign of the drive to combine more than one interception layer to handle drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles.

Morocco has also strengthened its reconnaissance and precision-strike capabilities by expanding its holdings of drones and guided munitions.

By contrast, the Moroccan procurement data for 2020–2026 show no comparable appetite for large deals in tanks, frigates or new fighter jets — an indication that conventional platforms carry less weight than systems offering rapid response and continuous defence.

The data also reveal that Morocco has adopted a clear policy of diversifying suppliers. The United States has remained the principal partner in aviation, munitions and air-defence deals, while Israel has emerged as an important supplier in air defence and drones, alongside continued cooperation with France on some programmes.

This diversity reflects Rabat's effort to reduce dependence on a single source.

Jordanian procurement data for 2020–2026 show that Amman has taken a different approach from the rest of the region, built on strengthening the operational readiness of its armed forces rather than seeking new combat platforms.

Instead of expanding purchases of tanks, naval vessels or modern fighters, the contracts the kingdom concluded between 2022 and 2026 concentrated on modernising its air force — upgrading F-16 fighters, contracting for UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, strengthening transport and support capabilities, and introducing advanced air-defence systems suited to the threats posed by missiles and drones in the region.

The data also show that the United States has remained Jordan's principal partner in aviation, helicopter and logistics support programmes.

Alongside modernising its combat aviation, Jordan asked the United States in October 2023 to deploy Patriot air and missile defence systems on its territory, amid mounting fears that the regional conflict would spread and that the country might face missile threats or drone attacks.

Jordanian officials have also spoken of the need to strengthen counter-drone capabilities, which have become a central element of modern warfare.

Unlike many Middle Eastern states that have signed vast import contracts in recent years to modernise their armies, Türkiye's experience between 2020 and 2026 reveals a different path.

While Ankara continued to seek advanced Western fighters to make up for delays in modernising its air force, the larger part of its defence investment went towards expanding domestic production and building integrated air and missile defence systems.

According to the data collected, the two deals recorded during 2024–2025 fall entirely within combat aviation: a deal for F-16 Block 70 Viper fighters from the United States, as Reuters reported, and a memorandum of understanding to buy up to 20 Eurofighter Typhoon jets from the United Kingdom and the Eurofighter programme partners, according to Euronews.

Algeria's armament data show that between 2020 and 2026 it largely preserved its traditional model of modernising military power through established suppliers — Russia foremost among them — with limited openness to China and some European partners.

It is worth noting that Algeria has not faced the same drone and ballistic-missile threats as other states in the region, nor does it host American military bases.

The latest SIPRI data place Algeria 21st worldwide among the largest arms importers in 2020–2024, though the volume of its military imports fell 73% compared with 2015–2019 — a decline the institute attributes mainly to procurement cycles rather than to any radical change in defence doctrine or a cut in military spending.

Russia remained Algeria's largest arms supplier, accounting for 48% of total imports, followed by China at 19% and Germany at 14%.

The report confirms that the decline extended to Russian exports to Algeria, which fell 81% against the previous period — a reflection of the difficulties facing Russia's defence industry since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

SIPRI's database shows that the most notable deliveries to Algeria during the period under study fell into only three main categories.

The first was the delivery of nine Russian combat aircraft, reflecting the continued priority given to modernising the Algerian air force.

The second was four American military transport aircraft, an indication of continued limited cooperation with the United States in transport and support, well away from strategic combat systems.

The third came in the form of six Chinese armed drones, reflecting China's gradual entry into the Algerian arms market in a sector of growing priority in modern warfare.

Algeria's data for the same period show no large announced deals for missile-interception or long-range air-defence systems from new suppliers.

Middle East armament data since the start of this decade point to the continued American dominance of the greater part of the region's arms market. At the same time, several states have sought to open additional supply channels with other parties, in a calculated diversification that stops well short of decoupling from the Western military system.

Detailed statistics from SIPRI show that Middle Eastern imports of major arms fell 13% overall between 2016–2020 and 2021–2025. Even so, the region still accounts for as much as 26% of global arms imports, driven by regional arms races and rising tensions that have pushed states to build up their defensive arsenals.

According to SIPRI, the United States accounted for 54% of the region's major arms imports in 2021–2025, followed by Italy at 12%, France at 11% and Germany at 7.3%, per the institute's March 2026 report.

Russia and China, by contrast, appear far less present. Moscow has cut its global arms exports by 64% in recent years, and only 6.45% of its exports went to the Middle East between 2020 and 2024. The institute notes that the reasons include the prioritisation of production for the war, sanctions, and Western pressure on buyers.

As for China, although it was the world's fifth-largest exporter in 2021–2025 with 5.6% of global exports, it does not appear among the Middle East's major suppliers in terms of overall regional share.

The table below summarises the leading suppliers by country, drawn from SIPRI's table of the largest arms importers in the Middle East during 2021–2025.

Alongside the aggregate shares SIPRI records, the investigation sets out detailed supplier maps for five of the states monitored, with the deals themselves classified by type of weapon — revealing where each country's money actually goes.

The deals across the Middle East reveal that the biggest beneficiary of the new armament wave was neither a single state nor a single company, but a network of Western suppliers who managed to re-entrench themselves in the region's markets at a time when the Russian presence receded markedly.

The United States stands out as the largest winner. American firms feature in most of the major deals the investigation recorded — from F-16 Block 70 fighters for Jordan and Türkiye, through NASAMS systems in Egypt and HIMARS in Morocco, to Hellfire, Javelin, Stinger and AMRAAM missiles.

That means American companies are no longer selling platforms alone; they are selling integrated systems that bundle radars, munitions, interception and logistics support.

Lockheed Martin, RTX and Boeing lead the list of beneficiaries. Lockheed Martin appears in the F-16, HIMARS, Javelin and Hellfire programmes; RTX benefits from the NASAMS, AMRAAM and Stinger deals; and Boeing maintains its presence through Apache and Chinook helicopters and guided bombs.

Israel, meanwhile, has emerged as a supplier of air-defence and drone technology — as in Morocco, through the Barak MX system and programmes to manufacture drones locally.

These deals show that Israel did not enter the competition through tanks and aircraft, but through the fastest-growing segments of the contemporary arms market.

South Korea also managed a significant breakthrough with Egypt's K9 Thunder deal — a sign of Korean firms' expansion in the regional arms market, helped by a combination of relatively lower cost and flexibility on technology transfer.

Russia, by contrast, and with the exception of its deals with Algeria, is the biggest absentee from the data recorded. Although Moscow was one of the region's foremost arms suppliers over the past two decades, the newly documented deals are all but devoid of any meaningful Russian presence. The same applies, to a lesser degree, to China.

These findings suggest that the recent wars did not merely raise demand for weapons; they also redistributed shares within the regional market.

The United States remains the dominant player, Israel and South Korea have expanded, and traditional suppliers that struggled to compete — or to meet the surging demand for modern interception and air-defence systems — have receded.

The Middle East's armament map can no longer be read solely through the size of deals or the identity of suppliers. It is now bound up with a further question: can these states produce weapons, maintain them, develop them, or own part of the industrial and technological value chains attached to them?

Protracted wars, the growing use of drones and missiles, and disrupted supply chains have pushed a number of regional states to reconsider total reliance on buying finished systems from abroad — particularly for munitions, spare parts, maintenance, software updates and keeping forces operating through long crises.

In this context, several Gulf and Middle Eastern states have begun recasting their relationship with the defence sector, moving from a focus on direct imports towards various formulas for industrial localisation, knowledge transfer, or partnership with international suppliers.

But this shift follows no single model. Saudi Arabia ties much of it to the goals of Vision 2030; the UAE has built a broad defence group with an overseas footprint; Qatar relies more on partnerships and technology investment; while Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain operate within narrower fields relating to munitions, offset, or defence services.

Türkiye appears the most advanced case in building a multi-sector domestic defence base, while Egypt relies on joint production and technology transfer.

Morocco is entering the field gradually through drones; Jordan remains closer to a maintenance and technical support model; and Algeria is moving through partnerships that allow local assembly and a partial transfer of expertise.

Gulf states have lately stopped treating weapons as a "platform" bought from abroad, and begun treating them as a strategic instrument and a lever for building a domestic defence industrial base — a move from a strategy of "buying weapons" to one of "localising the defence industry".

The Middle East was previously the world's largest arms-importing region, accounting for 27% of global imports in 2020–2024, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE ranked among the world's biggest importers in 2021–2025.

In parallel, drone and missile attacks on Saudi infrastructure, together with continuing security risks in the Gulf, demonstrated that building defensive capability cannot be limited to buying systems from abroad. This intersects with the Saudi localisation strategy, which, according to official documents, aims to strengthen strategic autonomy and military readiness and to build a domestic supply chain covering spare parts, munitions, manufacturing, maintenance and repair — reducing dependence on foreign sources to sustain military capability.

In Saudi Arabia, domestic defence manufacturing is a direct part of the architecture of Vision 2030. The official Vision document sets out the goal of "localising more than 50% of spending on military equipment by 2030", up from a share that did not exceed 2–4% before the Vision was launched.

To organise this shift, the General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI) was established in 2017 to take on the sector's legislative and regulatory role. It licenses local and international companies, develops industrial strategy, manages military procurement, and measures and enforces mandatory localisation rates through industrial participation programmes.

Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI), wholly owned by the Public Investment Fund, serves as the executive and commercial arm of that effort.

The company describes itself as "a national champion aiming to place Saudi Arabia among the world's top 25 defence companies".

SAMI runs a broad structure spanning five core sectors:

• Air systems
• Land systems
• Naval systems
• Weapons and missiles
• Advanced electronics

It has strengthened its capabilities by absorbing entities such as the Military Industries Corporation and by fully acquiring Advanced Electronics Company (AEC) to develop electronic and cyber warfare solutions.

By the end of 2024, the Saudi authorities announced that the "localisation of military spending" had jumped to about 24.89% — substantial interim progress towards the final target.

Examples of actual localisation in Saudi Arabia are numerous. In the naval sector, the company completed the Sarawat project with Spain's Navantia to produce five corvettes, in the course of which a naval combat management system was developed and localised for the first time under the name Hazem.

In land systems, SAMI developed its land industrial complex and, in mid-2025, signed memoranda and binding agreements for technology transfer and joint manufacturing with leading Turkish firms — including the transfer of 8x8 armoured vehicle technology with FNSS, 4x4 vehicles with Nurol Makina, and the localisation of combat turret manufacturing with ASELSAN.

In air systems, Saudi Arabia signed major contracts with Türkiye's Baykar that go beyond buying Akinci aircraft to include manufacturing airframes, electronic systems and munitions — laying the foundation for a national drone production base.

The UAE is the clearest Gulf model of an integrated defence corporate structure. In late 2019 EDGE Group was founded, bringing more than 25 Emirati defence and technology companies under one umbrella and later expanding to more than 35 entities across core clusters covering platforms and systems, missiles and weapons, space and cyber technologies, manufacturing, technology and innovation, and homeland security — with capabilities running from design, engineering and manufacturing to modernisation, overhaul and services.

Emirati manufacturing is notably more diverse than that of other Gulf states. In naval vessels and boats, Abu Dhabi Ship Building stands out, manufacturing and marketing attack and interceptor craft and the Falaj 3 class.

In armoured vehicles, the Emirati firm NIMR produces the Ajban, Hafeet and Jais vehicles, including the mine- and ambush-resistant Jais vehicles. The company has exported its vehicles and concluded production and technology-transfer agreements beyond the UAE, among them an agreement to manufacture Jais locally in Saudi Arabia, alongside supply contracts for the Algerian armed forces.

In smart munitions and drones, EDGE Group owns companies such as Halcon, which produces the Desert Sting glide bombs and loitering munitions, as well as the Sinyar combat drone, newly developed with Poland's Flaris to provide long-range reconnaissance and strike capability.

EDGE also unveiled in 2025 the NEMUS and TAWAQ radars, MIRSAD-class EO/IR systems, SKYSHIELD counter-drone solutions, and the BORDERSHIELD system with AI-driven detection, alongside GPS PROTECT anti-jamming systems.

Beyond that, the UAE has moved to a model of acquisition and product export, taking stakes in advanced technology companies in Europe such as Milrem Robotics in Estonia and Flaris in Poland.

EDGE announced a €1 billion contract to build naval corvettes for the Angolan navy through ADSB, then announced in 2025 a 9 billion dirham naval contract to supply FALAJ3 missile craft to Kuwait's defence ministry — describing it as the highest-value naval industry export in the region to date.

The company's official figures show that its products have reached 91 countries, that international orders exceeded $2.1 billion in 2024, and that exports came to represent 76% of total sales in 2025, according to a subsequent official disclosure.

Qatar's model is narrower than the Saudi and Emirati ones, but it is clearly organised around international partnerships, research and development, knowledge transfer, and building specialised capabilities inside the country.

According to the official description issued by Qatar Science and Technology Park, Barzan Holdings acts as the body responsible for enabling the military capabilities of the Qatari armed forces through partnership with leading international defence companies and organisations. It presents itself as a "commercial gateway" to Qatar's defence industry, offering opportunities for cooperation in research and development, facilitating knowledge transfer, and creating new defence and security technologies.

In the documented fields, Barzan has expanded its partnerships through the BARQ joint venture with ASELSAN to produce high-technology and electro-optical systems.

It has also signed memoranda of understanding with Turkish Aerospace Industries and STM to develop unmanned systems.

In smart software, Barzan concluded an agreement with the American firm GA-ASI to develop software capabilities for battle management and situational awareness, alongside agreements with major companies such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin to strengthen logistics support, maintenance and the development of local human capital.

What is striking about the Qatari model is that it extends to overseas investment to close gaps — as at the DIMDEX 2026 exhibition, with the signing of a trilateral agreement with Indonesia's Republikorp and South Korea's Poongsan to establish an ammunition plant in Indonesia, securing a sustainable supply of munitions.

Qatar's model is thus closer to a platform for defence partnerships and technology investment than a replication of the "defence industrial group" or the localisation system.

Oman Munitions Production Company (OMPC), established as a state facility in 2014, is the formal example of limited domestic manufacturing.

The sultanate invested in building a plant certified to international quality standards (ISO 9001) to supply the defence and internal security sectors with small-calibre ammunition meeting the highest NATO (STANAG) and U.S. military specifications.

Its products include 9x19mm pistol ammunition, 5.56x45mm assault rifle ammunition, and 7.62x51mm rounds for medium weapons and sniper rifles.

Kuwait has historically used offset policies — economic participation — as a tool to tie its defence procurement budget to development projects at home.

The Kuwaiti offset programme was administered by the Kuwait Direct Investment Promotion Authority (KDIPA), which imposed an obligation equal to 35% of the monetary value of defence supply contracts exceeding three million Kuwaiti dinars, and civil contracts exceeding ten million dinars, with that amount to be invested in sectors serving the Kuwaiti economy.

Because of implementation obstacles, however, the Kuwaiti cabinet issued decision No. 1212 suspending the programme gradually and re-evaluating its course — prompting the authority to redirect the remaining obligations mainly towards infrastructure projects and civil research and development initiatives.

This means Kuwait used offset as a tool for capturing economic and technological value from defence procurement, but the same official sources do not present a broad heavy defence manufacturing base or production complexes comparable to the Saudi and Emirati models.

Kuwait therefore looks closer to a model of "extracting economic and technological benefit from defence contracts" than one of "large-scale direct defence manufacturing".

Bahrain has a very limited model in heavy direct defence manufacturing, relying instead on a programme that ties procurement to industrial participation and the provision of services.

The Bahrain Defence Force Economic Programme (BDFEP) is the official source and the approved mechanism for this approach.

The programme obliges foreign arms suppliers to provide industrial and economic participation that creates benefits for the kingdom, with an emphasis on knowledge transfer and strengthening the military services and logistics sector.

Bahrain has therefore adopted a model of "localisation through industrial participation, services and technical support" alone, which cannot be classified as heavy manufacturing of equipment.

In concrete terms, Bahrain seeks to benefit from military contracts through fleet maintenance, developing port and air base infrastructure, and training engineering cadres — relying for its strategic security on the Gulf umbrella and international alliances.

1- Ammunition and small arms

Oman Munitions Production Company (OMPC) stands out for producing the core NATO calibres for rifles and pistols.

The Emirati firm Caracal (part of EDGE) has distinguished itself by manufacturing assault and sniper rifles and exporting them to advanced markets.

In Saudi Arabia, SAMI companies continue to produce ammunition and to develop dedicated plants for it.

2- Land systems

The Emirati company NIMR produces the Ajban and Hafeet vehicles and the second generation of the Jais Mk2 armoured vehicles, designed to withstand highly dangerous combat environments and exported to many countries.

In Saudi Arabia, the SAMI Land Systems Complex is currently being built to produce and assemble 8x8 and 4x4 armoured vehicles locally in partnership with the Turkish firms FNSS and Nurol Makina.

3- Shipbuilding, naval craft and maritime maintenance

The UAE has invested through Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB) to produce corvettes and naval patrol vessels such as the Falaj 3 class, along with advanced tactical craft for rapid interception.

Saudi Arabia, for its part, developed and integrated the domestic Hazem naval command-and-control system to operate the Sarawat ships, within a strategic partnership with Spain.

4- Drones and unmanned systems

EDGE Group has developed the Reach and Garmoosha aircraft series and vertical take-off drones, crowned by its partnership with Flaris to produce the jet-powered Sinyar LAR3P for reconnaissance and strike missions.

In Saudi Arabia, the major acquisition deal with Türkiye's Baykar has begun to establish domestic manufacturing capability for the advanced Akinci aircraft.

Through its acquisition of Milrem Robotics, the UAE is also working on manufacturing autonomous robotic ground systems such as the Havoc 8x8.

On missiles and smart guided munitions, the Emirati firm Halcon stands out for its precision glide bombs such as Desert Sting and the Hunter loitering munitions. This runs alongside the development of radars, sensing and counter-drone (C-UAS) systems: companies such as SIGN4L in the UAE offer innovative solutions for electronic jamming and convoy protection (V-PROTECT and SKYSHIELD), while Qatar's Barzan is exploring sensor development with its Turkish partners.

5- Secure military communications and C4ISR

Saudi Arabia offers C4I, radar and advanced communications solutions through SAMI-AEC.

The UAE dedicates one of EDGE's tracks to "Cyber Defence & Secure Communications", advertising technologies and training to protect institutions and secure their communications and sensitive data.

Qatar has a partnership base directed at this track through BARQ, in command and control and encryption.

6- Electronic warfare and defensive cyber

In 2025 the UAE unveiled EW systems, anti-jamming, radars and C-UAS solutions.

In Saudi Arabia, SAMI-AEC formally lists electronic warfare, intelligence, radars and advanced communications within its domestic portfolio.

In Bahrain, the defence economic programme places artificial intelligence, big data, encryption and robotics among the priorities for possible projects.

Türkiye represents the most advanced case in the region in domestic military manufacturing during 2020–2026.

Rather than concentrating on buying finished foreign systems, Ankara has invested heavily in developing domestic systems covering most major fields — from combat aviation to air defence, drones and armoured vehicles.

The transformation of Türkiye's domestic defence industry stands out in four main sectors:

1- Air defence

In July 2024 Ankara announced the launch of the "Steel Dome" project, a multi-layered air and missile defence system that integrates radars, sensors, missiles and command-and-control systems into a single network able to handle aircraft, drones and missiles of all kinds.

The project's pace accelerated markedly after regional tensions escalated, and after the Gaza war and then the Israeli–Iranian confrontation demonstrated the importance of layered air defence.

In November 2025 the Turkish Defence Industry Agency and domestic companies — chief among them ASELSAN, Roketsan and Havelsan — signed contracts worth some $6.5 billion in total to strengthen the Steel Dome project and expand production of its components.

The contracts cover radars, missile systems, command-and-control centres and various sensor systems, almost all of them produced domestically.

These contracts show that Türkiye now regards air defence as a strategic priority no less important than combat aviation. The project comprises dozens of interlinked elements — early warning systems, radars, interceptor missiles, electronic warfare systems and command centres — allowing the construction of an integrated national defence network that reduces the need for foreign systems.

Ankara has backed this with large industrial investment. In August 2025 ASELSAN announced a $1.5 billion investment to build a new technology complex — the single largest defence investment in the company's history — aimed at doubling production capacity for the electronic systems and air-defence systems tied to the Steel Dome project.

2- Aviation

Also prominent is the KAAN national fighter programme, run by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ), which completed its first test flight in 2024. The programme is seen as the cornerstone of Türkiye's efforts to reduce its future dependence on foreign fighters.

3- Drones

Baykar has continued developing and producing the heavy AKINCI drone, which has become one of the most prominent products of the Turkish defence industry and the most widely present in export markets.

4- Land forces

BMC continues to produce the Altay tank, the flagship project for modernising Türkiye's land forces.

Although Egypt still relies on foreign suppliers for a large number of major systems, the period between 2020 and 2026 saw an expansion in joint production and technology-transfer programmes.

The most prominent was the South Korean K9 Thunder howitzer contract, which Cairo signed with Hanwha Aerospace in 2022.

The contract was not limited to supplying self-propelled howitzers and ammunition and command vehicles; it also included technology transfer and the gradual domestic production of some components inside Egypt.

In the naval sector, the MEKO A-200 EN frigate programme marked an important step towards building domestic shipbuilding capability: the fourth of the four frigates was built at the Alexandria shipyard after technical expertise was transferred from the German side.

The Arab Organization for Industrialization also continued its programmes for producing and assembling military equipment and defence electronics in cooperation with international partners.

These projects indicate that Egypt has adopted a model based on industrial partnerships and technology transfer rather than on developing complete domestic systems from scratch.

A well-informed military source told Arabic Post, asking not to be named given the sensitivity of the subject, that Egypt is implementing a comprehensive upgrade plan for its weapons — including tanks it imported from the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, before an agreement two years ago to upgrade them, along with other weapons, by introducing modern technology to increase their military capability.

Over the past decades Egypt has benefited from the technologies it holds, the military source told Arabic Post, and local expertise now exists that is capable of upgrading them domestically — as with the Abrams tank, most of whose components are manufactured locally.

The military source told Arabic Post that upgrades are now under way for Egypt's armoured corps, as well as its aviation and air defence, along with the manufacture of vast quantities of ammunition, which remains of great importance should wars or protracted conflicts break out.

The EDEX 2025 exhibition featured 57 Egyptian military products, 18 of them entirely new — a reflection of the continuing expansion of military manufacturing programmes.

If Türkiye represents the most advanced model and Egypt the joint-production model, Morocco represents an emerging case seeking to build a limited but growing defence industrial base.

Like Türkiye, though to a lesser degree, Morocco has also begun building a domestic industrial base for drones. In 2024 the French newspaper Le Monde revealed the establishment of a production facility, in cooperation with the Israeli firm BlueBird, to assemble and produce WanderB and ThunderB drones inside Morocco, with the transfer of technical expertise and the training of local engineers.

The step is an indication of Rabat's move from being merely an arms importer to a state seeking to own part of the military production chain at home.

It also reflects a growing recognition of the importance of drones in modern warfare, whether in reconnaissance, surveillance or combat operations.

Jordan remains the least reliant on domestic military manufacturing among the four states covered by the investigation, with its efforts concentrated more on maintenance, modernisation and limited assembly of military equipment.

The King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau (JODDB) plays a pivotal role in this field, developing some vehicles and security and military systems locally.

Jordan Aerospace Industries also takes part in maintenance, modernisation and technical support for the air platforms operated by the Jordanian armed forces.

Despite a number of local industrial initiatives, Jordan does not, during the period under study, have major manufacturing programmes comparable to those in Türkiye or even Egypt. Its defence industry therefore remains concentrated mainly in technical support, maintenance and limited assembly.

The available data on domestic arms manufacturing in Algeria during 2020–2026 show that the country is moving along a different path from others in the region.

On the available evidence, Algeria does not appear to be at the stage of developing complete national combat systems. It relies instead on industrial partnerships with foreign companies that allow local assembly, a partial transfer of expertise, and the building of internal maintenance and training capability.

The clearest example is the partnership project with Italy's Leonardo to produce and assemble AW139, AW169 and AW189 helicopters inside Algeria.

The agreement with the Algerian defence ministry provides for establishing a joint company responsible for producing three types of helicopter in the country, along with maintenance, training and technical support services. That makes the project closer to building an industrial base for rotary-wing aviation than a straightforward purchase of finished helicopters.

Specialist industry reports confirm that the AW139 assembly plant in the Ain Arnat area has entered an advanced stage of construction and operation, strengthening Algeria's ability to move from importing to assembling air platforms locally. While the project does not mean Algeria owns complete helicopter manufacturing technology, it gives it significant capability in maintenance, technical support and keeping fleets operating.

On land, the Fuchs 2 armoured vehicle project is the second most prominent domestic manufacturing track. In 2024 it was announced that production of these vehicles would be expanded inside Algeria in partnership with Germany's Rheinmetall, in a contract described as worth hundreds of millions of euros. The partnership gives Algeria domestic production capability for armoured vehicles used in transport and protection roles, but it too remains within the model of licensed manufacturing tied to a foreign supplier.